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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Common wisdom teaches us to strive to leave as many options open for as 
long as possible. We are advised by mentors and peers to constantly re-examine 
decisions and offers, seek out new ones, and keep sight and control of the old. 
The general preference to keep all doors open is ubiquitous and exercised in 
various walks of life. Keeping doors open is a cultural phenomenon that has 
become part of the unique American experience. 
Leaving doors open is not merely a business or social dynamic. It is also 
reflected and rooted in the law in various ways, and can be articulated in 
legalistic terminology. The phenomenon of the open door is relevant to a 
variety of legal facets. This article focuses on open doors in the context of 
consumer contract law. Accordingly, the term “open door” will be used to refer 
to situations in which an individual can exercise, ex post, a right to rescind or 
withdraw from (and thus reverse) an ex ante commitment or decision.1 More 
specifically, within the realm of contract theory, this article focuses on 
 
Copyright © 2011 by Shmuel I. Becher and Tal Z. Zarsky. 
 This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. 
*  Associate Professor, The College of Management Academic Studies School of Law. LL.B., Tel 
Aviv University; LL.M, J.S.D., Yale Law School. 
** Associate Professor, University of Haifa Faculty of Law. LL.B., B.A., Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem; LL.M., J.S.D., Columbia University School of Law. The authors thank Jeremy Blumenthal, 
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Yaniv Mano, Avishalom Tor, Eyal Zamir, the participants in the 
“Behavioral Analysis of Law: Markets, Institutions and Contracts” workshop at the University of 
Haifa, and the participants in the Private Law Workshop at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for 
helpful comments. We also benefited from the research assistance of Yoni Friedman. We also 
acknowledge the kind support of the Research Foundation of The College of Management Academic 
Studies–School of Law, and the generous support of the Paedagogica Foundation. 
 1. In recent years, interest has grown in the way people make decisions, and its influence, among 
other things, on well-being and happiness. See, e.g., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002); THE LAW 
AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005). A few 
popular books, based on extensive academic research, address issues raised in this article, though not in 
detail, nor from a legal perspective. See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006); BARRY 
SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004). 
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implications for contract formation interpretation and the design of contractual 
default rules. 
A key example of the abstract notion of the open door in actual business 
practices is that of return policies. In general, liberal return policies are typical 
in many consumer markets.2 Put simply, when a consumer is granted (at the 
time of the transaction) a right to return a product to the seller and get her 
money back “no questions asked,” she is entitled to an open door.3 In such a 
case, the original decision—to enter a transaction and purchase an item—can be 
reversed. This example is discussed throughout the paper. 
On the face of it, leaving doors open makes perfect sense. Firms offering 
such opportunities should be encouraged and commended. Why shouldn’t we 
put off decision-making as long as possible while leaving all options open? 
After all, this reflects the general human tendency to procrastinate,4 and seems 
to have inherent value as well. In the meantime, another, better option could 
materialize or come to our attention, or new information may surface. Given 
the variety of options, the complexity of markets, and the sophisticated tastes of 
individuals, any extra time to contemplate a decision or transaction at stake 
must surely be a blessing.5 
Contrary to this line of reasoning, open doors are often not a blessing, but a 
curse in disguise. In many instances, keeping doors open might not be the 
optimal strategy to assure wealth maximization and happiness. Moreover, at 
times, an open door may be part of a carefully tailored strategy to manipulate 
individuals—to enter transactions they should avoid. 
The benefits associated with open doors and the conventional wisdom that 
promotes the notion of leaving doors open are detailed in part II. There are 
three basic ways in which the law can react to (or endorse) this phenomenon. 
First, it can impose open doors. For example, the law can provide mandatory 
cooling-off periods in which a party to a transaction can withdraw from it. 
Second, the law can encourage open doors by, for instance, formulating default 
 
 2. Lenient return policies and similar practices are part of a broader movement of generating trust 
and confidence in mass retail. These latter forms of commerce were an important shift in the United 
States, away from small, local shops (that at times discriminated among consumers). See JOSEPH 
TUROW, NICHE ENVY: MARKETING DISCRIMINATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 31 (2006). 
 3. Similarly, a borrower’s ability, after commencing a financial loan (such as a home equity loan), 
to refinance, pay, or substantially change its terms without penalty might also be referred to as an 
“open door.” Such rights are popular in U.S. loan markets, and are even mandated in several states. See 
Peter J. Wallison, Cause and Effect: Government Policies and the Financial Crisis, FIN. SERVS. 
OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research), Nov. 2008, at 6–7. The issue of whether 
refinancing resembles an open door or the formulation of a new agreement is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
 4. See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated 
Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1675 n.141 (2006) (providing various sources that 
support this assertion). 
 5. A recent working paper explains that in many instances, recognizing open door rights leads to 
efficient outcomes. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Eric Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract 
Law (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 514, 2010), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569753. 
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rules that call for open doors. Third, the law can allow the open door.6 Here, the 
law will simply respect parties’ decisions to opt for open doors and uphold their 
preferences. These three basic legal responses are detailed in part III. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, keeping doors open has its own pitfalls. 
Unfortunately, policymakers—not unlike the general population—tend to 
neglect the negative aspects of leaving doors open. This will be demonstrated in 
part IV, where the complex and rather counterintuitive consequences of the 
law’s tendency to allow, uphold, or encourage open doors are considered. 
The desire to leave doors open has far-reaching, diverse, and, at times, 
contradictory psychological, economic, and legal implications. In many cases, 
people assume that doors remain open for use at a later time when this is not, in 
fact, the case. Therefore, people’s reliance on the open door may lead to 
inefficient outcomes. This leads people to insist on getting an open door (and 
compensating the opposing party for it) although they seldom use it. Moreover, 
this leads people to engage in transactions they should rationally avoid, or to 
purchase products they need not buy. 
The problems associated with open doors call for a broad array of responses 
which must be inspected carefully. Initial recommendations for research are 
delineated in part V. However, the notions presented are merely a first step in 
understanding the impact of psychological phenomena on contract law and 
consumer protection policy. 
II 
THE INTUITIVE AND ANALYTICAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF OPEN DOORS 
In order to better understand the phenomenon of open doors and to 
consider the appropriate legal response to this practice, it is necessary to 
consider its benefits. Thus, the various benefits commonly associated with the 
notion of leaving doors open are addressed in this part. We set out four basic 
arguments. The first pertains to information gathering; the second to managing 
(or limiting) risk; the third to psychological well-being; and the fourth to 
positive externalities.7 
A. Open Doors and Information Gathering 
One of the most basic assumptions of efficient markets is that sufficient 
information exists for all parties involved in a transaction.8 In theory, rational 
 
 6. A fourth response—the law barring voluntary open door provisions and practices—is also 
possible. However, in view of the many advantages of such provisions as well as other policy 
considerations (such as avoiding paternalism), such a response seems extremely unlikely. 
 7. Insofar as our analysis draws clear distinctions among these different aspects, it is mainly for 
reasons of methodology and clarity. We are well aware that these benefits at times overlap and interact. 
 8. Human participants are expected to behave in ways that “(1) maximize their utility (2) from a 
stable set of preferences and (3) accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a 
variety of markets.” GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) 
(numerals inserted). 
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market participants have the knowledge and understanding of all the attributes 
of the transaction they engage in. They are well versed in all elements 
pertaining to competing products or services. They also possess the required 
attention span to decide among them. This range of knowledge allows market 
participants to properly select and price a transaction. In doing so they might 
employ a “weighted adding strategy,” which requires a thorough analysis of the 
options at stake, including all their pertinent attributes.9 
Clearly, such a setting virtually never materializes. Typically, parties lack 
sufficient information, or time and attention to gather, analyze, and digest it. 
This, in itself, is a solvable problem. In theory, parties might apply various 
decision-making mechanisms to work through the complex datasets they 
encounter,10 while using the time and attention they can spare to “satisfice.”11 
Moreover, parties might often blunder, but their errors will offset one another 
so the overall outcome might still be efficient and fair.12 
However, outcomes are not often efficient and fair. In many transactions, 
unsophisticated, one-shot players (such as consumers)13 systematically lack 
sufficient information and resources. At the same time, sophisticated, repeat 
players (such as retailers) benefit from superior information—conspicuously in 
instances when they dictate the contractual framework and terms. In such cases, 
if the consumers’ errors are in the same direction, legal intervention might be 
justified. 
 
 9. This strategy is discussed in many different decision-making contexts. See, e.g., James R. 
Bettman, Mary Frances Luce & John W. Payne, Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 187 (1998) (applying this strategy in the context of consumers). According to this 
strategy, a consumer assigns a weight to every attribute she wishes to compare. Important features 
receive relatively high weight while less significant attributes are given less weight. The consumer 
presumably scores each product characteristic. Finally, the consumer multiplies the weight and the 
given score, then adds all factors for one total score. This score will represent the product’s overall 
quality from the consumer’s viewpoint. A consumer who seeks to maximize utility chooses the product 
that received the highest total score. 
 10. Gerd Gigerenzer, Why Heuristics Work, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 20, 20 (2008) (naming 
logic, probability, and heuristics as three modes in which humans make decisions). 
 11. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 
129, 129 (1956) (noting that when making decisions, “organisms adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’; they do 
not, in general, ‘optimize’”). Simon also coined the term “bounded rationality” to refer to human’s 
computational limitations and definite ability. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND 
RATIONAL 198 (1957). For an illuminating discussion in the context of consumer decision-making and 
information overload, see David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of 
Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986); Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, Comment, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1986). 
 12. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 3 (1953). 
 13. Indeed, consumers themselves are repeat players in the sense that they engage in repeated 
transactions, at times even with the same vendor. However, as a class they lack sophistication, 
resources, and experience for the following reasons: First, even though consumers engage in many 
transactions, vendors engage in far more. Second, vendors have the ability, motivation, and knowledge 
to use information that transactions generate to learn a great deal about the transaction and the 
transacting party—something most consumers are unable to do. Third, vendors are able to structure the 
transaction based on the knowledge and insights they gather—architecturally, legally, and financially. 
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Considering this background, open doors provide consumers with more time 
to reflect on the pros and cons of a transaction.14 This time allows for 
examination of additional, competing options. And as time passes, new options 
may emerge or be discovered. This benefits consumers who are not familiar 
with the options that markets offer, or might offer in the near future. In 
addition, during this time, more information (negative or positive) might 
become available from third parties. 
Moreover, open doors provide parties with additional opportunities to learn 
about the product they have purchased, as they allow consumers to experience 
the product.15 A classic example would be a distance-selling transaction (by 
phone or the Internet) involving tangible products, accompanied by a lenient 
return policy.16 Typically, in distance selling, the consumer has not had a chance 
to interact directly with the product prior to purchase. By using the product, the 
consumer can ascertain its attributes and whether it truly suits her preferences 
and needs. 
To a lesser degree, similar logic applies to all sales of tangibles. Prior to a 
transaction, consumers can learn of a product’s attributes by reading about the 
product and examining it at the store. But the experience of using a product in 
the comfort of their home (where the pressures of sales representatives are 
absent) allows consumers to quickly and easily learn a great deal about the 
product. 
Of course, learning through experience is not limited to tangibles. A similar 
dynamic might transpire with intangible assets as well. Consider a newspaper 
subscription, a cell phone service, or any other service that comes at a set price. 
Ex ante, consumers typically believe they will be able to afford the service 
without financial hardship. However, after some time, consumers might learn 
that they have committed themselves to a demanding payment schedule that is 
beyond their means. If consumers have an open door, they can rescind their 
contract and enter a new one that accommodates their economic circumstances. 
Living through the contractual terms assists individuals in understanding the 
“true” meaning, implications, and complications of a transaction. 
Rather than outward, extra time allows a party to look inward. Time allows 
a purchaser to better understand her preferences, financial situation, and 
personal taste—whether through further investigating, or experiencing a 
product or service. 
 
 14. Open doors can assist consumers in learning how products fit in their home or with other 
products. See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 20. 
 15. This is often the case because the purchaser has the actual possession. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & 
Posner, supra note 5, at 15 (referring, for example, to musical equipment). 
 16. Interestingly, some legislatures outside the United States provide consumers with a mandatory 
right to cancel a long-distance selling transaction. See Georg Borges & Bernd Irlenbusch, Fairness 
Crowded out by Law: An Experimental Study on Withdrawal Rights, 163 J. INST. & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 84, 85–86 (2007) (comparing general EU rules on consumer withdrawal rights with policies of 
members states). 
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B. Open Doors and the Allocation of Risk 
Information gathering is merely one aspect of open doors. Additionally, 
open doors assist in allocating risks among parties. If a consumer wishes to 
maximize her utility through open market transactions, she must accurately 
assess the risks involved. In consumer markets, there are various forms of risk 
(for instance, that a product’s value will fall, or that circumstances will change, 
influencing a consumer’s subjective value of the product). The contractual 
bargain constitutes a risk allocation. 
But drawing up contract terms to address all relevant risks is easier said than 
done. Markets commonly lead to inefficient outcomes as some participants—
typically one-shot, unsophisticated ones—tend to miscalculate the underlying 
risks.17 Repeat and sophisticated players have the opportunity, resources, and 
profit incentive to hedge, minimize, properly evaluate, and avoid unwarranted 
risks. Open doors can help weaker parties minimize some risks and evaluate 
others better.18 
In addition, open doors can minimize the risk that relevant preferences will 
change in the near future. As a simple example, assume that a consumer 
purchases an item and shortly after, receives a similar item as a gift. Her need 
for the purchased item usually diminishes. A similar dynamic occurs after a 
consumer purchases a warm coat for the upcoming winter, and then learns that 
the winter is forecast to be rather mild. The longer period an open door 
provides, the more likely it is to help individuals who face changing 
circumstances. 
Moreover, open door mechanisms help unsophisticated players minimize an 
additional risk: that the opposing party will breach the agreement and shirk its 
short-term obligations. An open door reassures the consumer, at least to some 
extent, that the purchased product or service is not defective and that it will 
meet its asserted specifications and descriptions. With an open door mechanism 
in place, potential aggrieved consumers can automatically obtain the remedy 
they would seek should the product or service be defective. In such a case, 
consumers can rescind the transaction at minimal cost, without the need to 
litigate their claims.19 Thus, an open door limits the risk that the consumer will 
suffer from a breach20 or a defective product.21 
 
 17. For a debate on consumers’ ability to learn from experience and minimize risk, see Oren Bar-
Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008); Richard A. 
Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803 (2008). 
 18. For a discussion of how return policies can minimize uncertainty in these transactions, see Ben-
Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 7–8. 
 19. While the risk of shirking parties might seem minimal in view of the clear course of legal action 
that harmed parties may take, things are far from being so simple. For one-shot, unsophisticated 
players, access to the legal system is costly and limited. Thus, in many cases (especially given the limited 
benefits of such claims), consumers will refrain from initiating legal action. 
 20. Note, however, that open door mechanisms merely protect consumers’ restitution interest. A 
breach might generate greater damages and thus call for the protection of a consumers’ reliance and 
expectation interest. To meet this objective, consumers would still have to consider litigation. 
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C. Open Doors, Positive Emotions, and Psychological Effects 
The reasons noted thus far support open doors from what can be viewed as 
an economic perspective. Thus far, this article has dealt with individuals’ 
preferences. Yet open doors have additional, psychological dimensions as well. 
By and large, even when individuals do not anticipate immediate changes in 
their preferences or circumstances, they feel much more confident making 
decisions once they know the decisions can be easily reversed, with minimal 
costs. In western liberal countries, people tend to view such a right as part of 
our freedom, which we so greatly cherish. The mere option to cancel decisions, 
or at least postpone them, is psychologically reassuring. If we must choose 
between making a final decision and making one that can be revoked, we will 
most likely opt for the latter—and doing so will give us comfort. Thus, open 
door strategies and provisions are not only efficient in the strictly monetary 
sense. They also promote emotional well-being on the most basic level: by 
enhancing satisfaction.22 
D. Open Doors, Competition, and Positive Externalities 
Lastly, the phenomenon of open doors can lead to positive externalities by 
proving beneficial to competitors. When contracts are “final” and no open door 
is available, individuals are “locked” into their initial decision. Once a binding 
contract exists, it is quite expensive or difficult for consumers to breach and opt 
to contract with a competitor. Usually these “lock-in” effects are enforced by 
harsh penalties if contracts are breached midway. Given the high switching costs 
consumers might encounter, potential competitors have very limited ability to 
compete for consumers who have entered into a binding contract. 
By providing consumers with an easy exit option, open door provisions can 
enhance efficiency. Open doors enable competitors to pursue potential 
consumers even when they are in a contractual relationship with another firm.23 
This dynamic lowers entry costs to markets and facilitates competition. As a 
result, open doors may encourage variety and quality in consumer markets. 
Before proceeding, an important caveat should be inserted. So far, the 
assumption has been that the open door mechanism devised in the underlying 
contract and the open door put into practice are the same. This is not always the 
case. In many instances, the policies formulated in a contractual framework are 
 
 21. The specific benefits mentioned here can be also achieved through other legal means, such as 
consumer protection laws, class actions, et cetera. See generally Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, 
Consumers’ Right of Withdrawal: A Well-Reasoned Right or a Pyrrhic Victory?, 32 TEL AVIV U. L. 
REV. 127 (2010) (in Hebrew). 
 22. This intuition has been examined and challenged in several psychological experiments. See, e.g., 
GILBERT, supra note 1. 
 23. This ability has the most relevance in the context of long-term contracts, especially for services. 
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far harsher than those applied in practice.24 For various reasons, firms have little 
to lose and much to gain from practicing a more lenient approach than is 
articulated in the contract.25 However, for clarity, and since these are unstable 
and unpredictable outcomes, this article assumes that most firms often exercise 
their formal policy as stipulated in the contract.26 
III 
THE COMMON WISDOM OF OPEN DOORS AND THE LAW 
Open doors have various positive attributes. Hence, it might seem natural 
that the law adopt the idea of open doors and, perhaps, encourage its usage. As 
detailed next, the notions of open door are embedded in the existing legal 
framework in three main ways. 
In the most drastic and obvious form, open doors are rendered mandatory. 
In other instances, the law approves open door policies in more subtle ways, 
such as setting them as defaults. Finally, the law can simply uphold open door 
provisions in a contractual framework. By allowing the implementation of open 
doors, the law further enables market participants to employ open doors. 
A.  Mandatory Open Doors 
The rulebooks provide a variety of instances in which a contractual open 
door mechanism is mandated.27 Perhaps the most famous example is that of 
 
 24. Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form 
Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 
858 (2006). 
 25. See generally Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form 
Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303 (2008). 
Some commentators argue that such strategies are even efficient and preferable in certain 
circumstances. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827–28 (2006) (“A seller concerned about its reputation 
can be expected to treat consumers better than is required by the letter of the contract.”). 
 26. A mirroring problem is possible as well: firms might contractually provide open doors that go 
beyond those that the sales representative conveys to consumers. For a discussion of instances when 
this form of conduct is purposeful and strategic (as a measure to generate price discrimination among 
consumers), see David Gilo & Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconscionability Through a Market Lens, 52 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 133, 155 (2010). Gilo and Porat refer to such practices as relying upon “Selective 
Beneficial Terms.” Their example is of a subscription to an Internet Service Provider (ISP), which 
provides, in fine print only, for the right to cancel within a certain period of time. This right is not 
evident to consumers who do not read the fine print. We refrain from developing this point for the 
reasons set forth in the text. Also, we believe that novel ways for distributing consumer information will 
prove helpful in closing this information gap. For an analysis of this dynamic, see Becher & Zarsky, 
supra note 25. 
 27. For some reviews of this legal framework, see JOHN A. SPANOGLE, RALPH J. ROHNER, DEE 
PRIDGEN & JEFF SOVERN, CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 252–53 (3d ed. 2007); Colin 
Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation 
for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case of “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1211, 1238 (2003); Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5. See also IAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER LAW 
AND POLICY 141, 330–46, 555 (2d ed. 2007) (United Kingdom); Becher & Zarsky, supra note 21 
(Israel). 
BECHER & ZARKSY 2/15/2011   
Spring 2011] OPEN DOORS, TRAP DOORS, AND THE LAW 71 
mandatory “cooling off” periods.28 These are set by federal29 and state30 
legislators and regulators for door-to-door sales, and, in some cases, time-
sharing sales. In these circumstances, open door mechanisms protect consumers 
from falling prey to aggressive sales tactics and undue pressure.31 
Mandatory open doors, however, go beyond door-to-door and time-sharing 
sales.32 Regulators have set them in place for somewhat risky transactions (and 
therefore as an appropriate measure to reassess risk) such as used car sales (so-
called lemons laws).33 In addition, they have been set in place for important and 
substantial transactions (such as home equity loans),34 where both reassessment 
of risk and the additional information gathering by the weaker party might be 
essential. In the European Union (EU)35 and other countries,36 extensive 
regulatory frameworks provide a “right to rescind” distance sales. These laws 
pertain to catalogs and phone orders, and have been broadened to e-commerce 
transactions.37 So far, such regulation has not been enacted in the United 
States.38 
 
 28. For a general background and discussion, see SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 27, at 251–59. 
 29. See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1995) (mandating a cooling-off period in door-to-door transactions). 
 30. According to one study, every state—and the District of Columbia—has enacted a cooling-off 
statute. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW app. 14A 
(2009). 
 31. See, e.g., Arizona v. Direct Sellers Ass’n of Ariz., 494 P. 2d 361 (1972) (upholding a statute 
regulating door-to-door salesmen, citing a Congressional report that noted “a disproportionate number 
of door-to-door sales involve misleading or high pressure sales”). 
 32. Some loan and financing regulations allow borrowers to refinance or terminate their loan with 
minimum costs, at any time. There is heated debate as to how these policies impacted the recent 
economic crisis. See Wallison, supra note 3. The law also assures that firms provide consumers with 
portability, that is, the ability to switch easily to a different provider. The Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (HIPAA) ensures that medical 
insurance providers allow the insured to switch jobs by requiring firms to insure against preexisting 
conditions. The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) mandates local phone number portability, 
which promotes competition in telecommunications markets and limits incumbents’ ability to lock up 
their existing customer base. 
 33. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 198-b (McKinney 2004). One might argue that these rules 
counter “aggressive” tactics of used car salesmen as well. 
 34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1995) (Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667(f)) (provision 
mandating a three-day right to rescind home equity loans)); Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-709, 102 Stat. 4725 (amending provisions of the Truth in Lending Act). 
 35. See Pamaria Rekaiti & Roger Van den Bergh, Cooling-off Periods in the Consumer Laws of the 
EC Member States: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach, 23 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 371 (2000); 
Borges & Irlenbusch, supra note 16. 
 36. Australia and New Zealand are two examples. For a report addressing this issue in the Asia–
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) region, see Elec. Commerce Steering Grp., Int’l,  Approaches 
to Consumer Protection Within the APEC Region, NORTH AM. CONSUMER PROJECT ON ELEC. 
COMMERCE (Oct. 2002), http://www.nacpec.org/docs/Approaches_to_consumer_protection.pdf. 
 37. See, e.g., Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 35. One of the rationales for extending such 
protection to the Internet in the EU was to promote e-commerce. Some argue that applying this 
rationale to the U.S. legal and business setting on its own seems unfitting. Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra 
note 5, at 4. For a challenge to the basic premise of this rationale, see Becher & Zarsky, supra note 21, 
at 190–92. 
 38. For a recent call to extend the current legal setting and add additional default “open door” 
rules, see Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5. 
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B.  Legal Frameworks that Promote Open Door Policies 
Imposing a mandatory open door regime is a harsh legal intervention in the 
market. Setting default rules is a milder measure.39 Defaults are usually set to 
meet the common preferences of transacting parties, thus limiting overall 
transaction costs. In some instances, defaults take on a different role—one 
which strives to encourage the transfer of information among transacting parties 
(“penalty default rules”) or affect the transacting parties’ behavior in a manner 
the state deems fit.40 
In various contractual frameworks, open doors are set as defaults in 
accordance with these latter rationales.41 In the realm of retail, several states 
have enacted regulation concerning consumers’ right to return goods or the way 
vendors should present their return policies.42 Arguably, regulators strive to use 
defaults as instruments for promoting the transfer of information on return 
policies. Or else, the default is used to encourage the adoption of open doors in 
the market. 
At other points, the law gives a milder, subtler nod. This occurs in the 
context of rolling contracts or online software agreements. Here, courts and 
commentators have been debating whether the terms included in a software 
package constitute a binding contract. A major impediment to recognizing the 
existence of a contractual framework is the lack of actual consent to the terms 
by the purchasing party prior to entering and “accepting” the transaction. 
A famous court decision, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,43 may illustrate. In this 
decision, still considered by many as good law,44 Judge Easterbrook of the 
Seventh Circuit held that a binding contract was formulated when the software 
was purchased, in accordance with the terms detailed in the software box. The 
court did so, even though the contractual terms could not be viewed prior to 
formation. The court found that the ex ante flaw regarding actual assent could 
be cured by the purchasers’ ex post ability to view the terms and return the 
 
 39. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003) (introducing the concept of libertarian paternalism, associating 
consumer cooling-off periods with it, and explaining that libertarian paternalism “is a relatively weak 
and nonintrusive type of paternalism, because choices are not blocked or fenced off”). 
 40. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). See also Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and 
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998). 
 41. In the financial context, policy, at times, actively facilitates open doors. For instance, the 
federal government has put in place an elaborate system that enables banks to offer fixed-rate or long-
term loans which allow refinancing at any time. In other words, these loans allow the borrower to exit 
one loan and opt for another. The government does so at considerable expense. The rise and fall of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are possibly related to these issues. See Wallison, supra note 3, at 4–6. 
 42. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 218-a (McKinney 2009); Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (LexisNexis 2009); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1723 (Deering 2009). 
 43. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). For a recent analysis revisiting this 
case, see Randal C. Picker, Easterbrook on Copyright, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165 (2010). 
 44. Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 469 (2006). 
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product thereafter.45 The existence of the open doors in this context served as a 
substitute for one of the most fundamental elements of contract formation: ex 
ante consent to the contract and its terms. That is, not only are open door 
options useful, they could actually replace one of the most important 
components of a binding contract. Interestingly, a somewhat refined but 
generally similar notion was accepted most recently in the Principles of 
Software Contracts.46 
C.  Upholding and Reinforcing Open Doors 
In many realms of business—retail and wholesale are cornerstone 
examples—market participants use open doors voluntarily. Recent studies 
indicate the enormous popularity of such practices, which in some instances are 
extremely lenient.47 Firms offer these mechanisms for a variety of reasons: to 
meet consumer preferences, to signal quality, to promote goodwill, or to engage 
in sophisticated marketing. 
These instances might seem to be located outside the realm of regulation 
and legal intervention. But they are not. This is so because courts uphold 
contracted open door rights, with regard to both the existence of the right and 
its limits. Additionally, regulators may intervene in these relations, by 
mandating additional disclosures or changing the rights and obligations of the 
contracting parties. 
This perspective may seem trivial and its analysis futile. Why not uphold 
contractual obligations that seem to benefit weaker parties in closing 
information gaps and assessing risks, as well as having positive psychological 
and externality effects? On its face, there is no reason to object to agreements 
that allow consumers more time to contemplate their transactions, thus 
maximizing their utility and satisfaction. Yet as we now explain, this sunny 
outlook of open doors is not always accurate. 
IV 
THE PROBLEMS OF OPEN DOORS 
Open doors lead to very different outcomes from those portrayed in the 
previous parts. The intuitions that support open doors are, in many instances, 
wrong.48 This misunderstanding leads to a flurry of problems, which at times 
override the apparent benefits that open doors present.  
 
 45. For a recent analysis, see Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5. 
 46. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 (2010). For a 
recent discussion, see Hannibal B. Travis, The Principles of the Law of Software Contracts: At Odds 
With Copyright, Consumers, and European Law?, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1557 (2010). 
 47. Examples include, inter alia, Costco, Macy’s, Walmart, and Target. For a sample of these 
lenient policies, see Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
 48. Having additional (or “more”) legal rights as opposed to less is, at times, detrimental to society 
at large. See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better Than Less: An 
Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634 (2008). Lewinsohn-Zamir shows how many existing 
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In this context, regulators seem to do too little. Currently, open door 
mechanisms are mandated, encouraged, or upheld, with the parties left to their 
own devices. Understanding the pitfalls that come with open doors might help 
regulators and policy-makers formulate the way the legal approach to open 
doors ought to be crafted. 
In many instances, open doors lead to negative outcomes for the 
unsophisticated contracting party that occur without that party’s understanding 
or knowledge.49 First and foremost, firms commonly (and at times subtly) inflate 
the transaction costs involved in rescinding a contract in various ways.50 For 
instance, firms make sure that contacting the representative in charge of 
canceling a service is next to impossible. In other instances, they set strict 
demands for physically returning a product. These problems are quite common 
and cannot be corrected by competition or consumer complaints given several 
persistent market failures.51 
Misrepresentations of open doors and imposing undue burdens on 
consumers who wish to return a product or cancel a contract, are indeed 
problematic. But there are further problems in the open door process that are 
currently unrevealed. 
A.  Are Open Doors Indeed Open? Valuing and Perceiving Open Doors 
In many cases, and for many consumers, open doors are not truly open. The 
ability to rescind an agreement and exercise an open door might not be as 
straightforward as it seemed at the time of formation. To verify this claim, one 
should examine the marketing, business, and psychological dynamics involved 
in open door mechanisms. 
 
property-related norms strangely limit the autonomy and rights of various players—supposedly 
undermining efficiency and fairness. However, her analysis shows that, in light of behavioral insights 
and cognitive failings, these rules are, in many cases, optimal. Our premise differs from Lewinsohn-
Zamir’s on a central point: rather than explaining the rationale behind existing law and justifying it 
based on a behavioral analysis, we use behavioral analysis to demonstrate that current law ought to be 
reexamined. 
 49. For example, regulators intervened in transactions which included open doors that were 
apparently misleading or fraudulent. In some cases, signs indicating “Free Trial Period!” and “Money 
Back—GUARANTEED!” were, indeed, too good to be true. Some involved “bait and switch” 
schemes, where the product provided was not the one advertised. Others misled consumers as to the 
difficulty of rescinding the initial transaction. The Federal Trade Commission has taken steps to 
regulate “negative option plans” and “free trial offers” involving “book of the month clubs” and other 
such settings. See SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 27, at 236–37. Regulators moved to assure proper 
disclosure prior to the transaction regarding the nature of the open door option, as well as the steps 
required to rescind it. 
 50. Sovern, supra note 4, at 1644. But see Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 16 (indicating that 
firms at times “exploit natural barriers” as a measure to limit the consumers’ ability to rescind contracts 
for strategic reasons). The use of such implicit barriers, even for achieving this fair outcome, is 
troubling. 
 51. Sovern, supra note 4, at 1667. 
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1. Are Open Doors Salient? 
A preliminary question is whether parties presented with an open door 
factor it into their decision of whether to transact. The analysis here assumes 
that often this is indeed the case. It further assumes that parties implicitly 
“price” the open door option, and willingly pay for it. To this end, the 
distinction between salient and non-salient open door mechanisms should be 
explained. 
As many standard form contracts include dozens of pages and hundreds of 
elements, it is highly unlikely that a contracting party will allocate sufficient 
attention to them all.52 A major reason for the existence of an open door is to 
assist the consenting party in overcoming the almost impossible task of reading 
and understanding all contract terms. It is widely agreed, for example, that 
consumers tend not to read form contracts most of the time, and for various 
good reasons.53 
In light of this reality, contract law scholars distinguish between “salient” 
and “non-salient” terms and provisions.54 The salient ones are those that parties 
read (or learn of their existence in another way),55 comprehend, and consider. 
Non-salient provisions are given less weight or are simply ignored.56 
The distinction is significant. According to this line of reasoning, salient 
provisions—the most usual examples are price and quantity terms—can 
generally be enforced by courts, requiring limited judicial scrutiny. In 
competitive markets, parties effectively signal to each other their preferences 
and consent insofar that salient attributes are at stake. These instances conform 
to the overall notion of the freedom to contract and the autonomy of 
contracting parties. 
 
 52. A classic economic assertion in this context is that, where strong competition exists, it is enough 
that some consumers (a substantial minority) shop for contract terms in order to discipline sellers and 
generate a fair and efficient market. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets 
on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979). 
This thesis has been questioned and criticized from various perspectives. See, e.g., R. Ted Cruz & 
Jeffery J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for 
Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1996). 
 53. See, e.g., Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read 
the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts (N.Y.U. Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443256; Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard 
Form Contracts: Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 
199 (2010); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual 
Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617 (2009). 
 54. See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. 
L. REV. 118, 170–177 (2007); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003). 
 55. This flow of information is generated by (usually experienced) consumers in various ways. For 
a detailed analysis, see Becher & Zarsky, supra note 25. 
 56. The distinction between these categories is not clear-cut, and a term that is non-salient at the 
time of the transaction might become salient at a later time. 
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Non-salient elements should be treated differently. If individuals do not pay 
attention to some contract provisions, no consent emerges and no signaling 
occurs. Thus, the preferences of market participants cannot be incorporated 
and reflected in the contractual terms. Rather, in such a case, the contract is a 
result of the will of the drafting party and the ignorance of the other. For that 
reason, commentators have noted that courts (ex post) and regulators (ex ante) 
should intervene to protect ignorant, unsophisticated players from imbalanced, 
non-salient provisions.57 
One of the fundamental questions in this respect is whether open door 
mechanisms are salient. On the one hand, open doors resemble many other 
elements that are considered non-salient. Open door provisions pertain to an 
uncertain and relatively unpleasant event which might take place in the future 
(the dissatisfaction with the product or service purchased). The chances of it 
occurring may seem rather slim.58 This places open door provisions among 
typically neglected elements such as remedies, forum selection clauses, and 
arbitration terms. The potential non-saliency of open doors presents a strong 
argument for setting open doors as defaults or through mandatory rules. 
On the other hand, open door clauses enjoy some degree of public attention. 
For instance, recent surveys indicate that consumers assign considerable 
importance to return policies.59 This might be explained given the cultural 
significance of this element in U.S. retailing.60 In view of these findings, some 
degree of salience of open doors from consumers’ perspective may be 
reasonably assumed. 
Until robust empirical data is gathered, the analysis should include several 
preliminary distinctions. First, open doors have salient and non-salient 
elements. Arguably, people often notice their mere existence or absence, and 
maybe even the extent of the period they are open for. However, the specific 
terms that accompany open doors (for example, requirements such as keeping 
 
 57. See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair Contracts” Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer 
Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 749 n.2–4 (2009); Korobkin, 
supra note 54. 
 58. There are different perspectives and findings on this issue. For empirical data regarding the low 
rate of actual returns (in this study, sixteen percent), see J. Andrew Petersen & V. Kumar, Can Product 
Returns Make You Money?, 51 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. No. 3, 85 (2010), available at http:// 
sloanreview.mit.edu/the-magazine/articles/2010/spring/51316/can-product-returns-make-you-money/. 
For somewhat different findings in the electronics and computer realm, see Yeon-Koo Che, Customer 
Return Policies for Experience Goods, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 17, 17 (1996) (“As many as 20% of personal 
computers sold to home buyers are known to be returned. . . .”). 
 59. See, e.g., Erika Morphy, Survey: Customers Want Flexible Return Policies (Jan. 8, 2007), 
available at http://www.crmbuyer.com/story/55031.html?wlc=1286145522 (seventy-five percent find a 
clear and simple return policy to be a highly important attribute); Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, 
at 20 (“Return policy is not the type of fine print term that goes under the radar, hidden from 
consumers’ plain sight.”). 
 60. TUROW, supra note 2. See also Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 20 (“Buyers seek 
information about the sellers’ return policies, because most buyers anticipate returns as a non-trivial 
contingency.”). 
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receipts or original packaging—which lead to “transaction costs”61) might 
frequently be beyond the attention span of the average consumer. 
Second, firms offering open door mechanisms sometimes take steps to 
render them salient or non-salient. In some cases, firms promote the salience of 
open door provisions by advertising: explicitly indicating specific transactions as 
“free trial periods,” or emphasizing “money back guarantee” or “cancel 
anytime” elements.62 In other cases, firms strive to render these elements non-
salient by “burying” references to the actual open door mechanism in their 
contracts.63 Clearly, different instances require different analyses. 
Third, even if consumers account for the existence of the open door and its 
“price,” we must inquire whether they calculate its value correctly. When 
addressing options and their pricing in general, the option holder takes into 
account the chance that the relevant event will materialize. At the time of an 
initial consumer-related transaction, individuals must take into account the 
factors addressed in part II: the chance that at a later time, additional 
information, added risks, or changes in preferences will render the transaction 
undesirable. Also, the option holder should take into account the possibility 
that her analysis is wrong—a risk that, in many markets, is quite predictable 
(and thus subsequently hedged). Moreover, consumers should furthermore 
consider whether the direct or indirect (or perhaps hidden) costs and 
requirements involved in exercising the option would render such actions 
unfeasible. This is especially important in ordinary consumer markets, which 
deal with relatively cheap and simple goods. 
These elements make a proper assessment of open door options rather 
difficult. People face serious difficulties assessing outcomes of specific events 
that have the general traits of open door dynamics. Those difficulties are 
aggravated by the problems and phenomena addressed below. And once the 
error is predictable and can be induced by the interested party, the problem 
becomes worse and might call for more aggressive regulatory measures. 
2. Open Doors and the Endowment Effect 
The endowment effect is one of the key contributors to the misperception of 
open doors. It refers to the additional disproportionate value individuals attach 
to assets they possess or own. For instance, in one famous study, students were 
randomly assigned mugs. Those who owned the mugs demanded far more 
money as sellers than those who were not given mugs were willing to pay as 
 
 61. See Sovern, supra note 4. 
 62. For examples in ISP markets, see SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 27, at 237. For an interesting 
illustration, see the General Motors (GM) TV ad, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpqr4 
_ONew0 (featuring GM CEO Ed Whittaker conspicuously promoting the “60-Day-Money-Back 
guarantee”). 
 63. This might lead to efficient outcomes by allowing firms to discriminate between diligent and 
non-diligent consumers. See Gilo & Porat, supra note 26, at 155 (providing insightful, though esoteric 
and rare examples). 
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buyers.64 In another study, one group of students was assigned mugs, while a 
second was assigned Swiss chocolate. After a short while, both groups were 
asked whether they would like to replace the assigned item. In both groups, an 
overwhelming majority (about ninety percent) preferred staying with the item 
they were originally assigned.65 
This effect was replicated in a variety of settings, cultures, and participants.66 
Studies indicate that such a change in subjective value is significant, attaches 
instantaneously, and grows with time.67 The endowment effect is activated as 
early as the moment when goods are purchased remotely (online or through a 
catalog),68 or even earlier.69 This can lead to overestimation of one’s rights or 
assets, which can lead to mistakes.70 
The endowment effect generates a force that should not be underestimated. 
Yet, it commonly is.71 This leads to a problem: because individuals do not 
correctly predict the extent of the endowment effect, they are unable to assess it 
accurately.72 As one scholar puts it, 
If we are not sure whether or not we should get a new sofa, the guarantee of being 
able to change our mind later may push us over the hump so that we end up getting it. 
We fail to appreciate how our perspective will shift once we have it at home, and how 
we will start viewing the sofa—as ours—and consequently start viewing returning it as 
a loss. We might think we are taking it home only to try it out for a few days, but in 
fact we are becoming owners of it and are unaware of the emotions the sofa can ignite 
in us.73 
 
 64. The phenomenon was first documented by Richard Thaler some thirty years ago. See Richard 
Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980). 
 65. Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 
AM. ECON. REV. 1277, 1278 (1989). 
 66. But see Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap: 
the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 
95 AM. ECON. REV. 530 (2005) (challenging the robustness of the endowment effect). 
 67. See, e.g., Ziv Carmon & Dan Ariely, Focusing on the Forgone: Why Value Can Appear So 
Different to Buyers and Sellers, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 360 (2000). 
 68. Stacy L. Wood, Remote Purchase Environments: The Influence of Return Policy Leniency on 
Two-Stage Decision Processes, 38 J. MARKETING RES. 157, 160 (2001). 
 69. A possible earlier point is when a bidder in an online auction has remained the highest bidder 
for an extended period of time. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 135–36 (2008) (stating 
that, in these instances, the endowment effect is triggered by “virtual ownership”). 
 70. For example, the endowment effect can distort litigants’ willingness to settle a case. See 
generally Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties To Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside 
the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (1999). 
 71. See generally George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes, 105 
ECON. J. 929 (1995) (study indicating individuals’ inability to predict the endowment effect). See also 
sources cited infra note 73. For applying the concept of the endowment effect to contract law, see, for 
example, Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1232 
(2003). 
 72. Whether consumers can learn over time about these effects and correct their decision-making 
process is a thorny question. As explained below, we are skeptical whether this is indeed possible in this 
context. 
 73. ARIELY, supra note 69, at 137. See also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 734 (1999) 
(“Significantly, it has been demonstrated that people are unable to predict the operation of the 
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While the strength and breadth of the endowment effect is not always fully 
understood by consumers, it is surely appreciated in the world of business and 
marketing. Vendors, service providers, and their consultants fully recognize that 
“moving” merchandise into the hands of consumers is the way to get the deal 
done.74 To do so, they employ various strategies. One of them is providing 
consumers with open doors. 
Thus, the endowment effect plays a crucial—yet underestimated—role in 
the open door dynamic. Individuals who are provided with an open door 
misperceive the impact the endowment effect will have on their decision to 
ultimately exercise that option.75 Ex ante, consumers assume they will exercise 
the open door option should the product (or service) not meet their preferences 
as they see them at that time. However, they misperceive the fact that their 
chances of exercising the option are substantially lower. The endowment effect 
strengthens the consumer’s connection to a possessed product and increases its 
value in her eyes. Slightly restated, the consumer assumes her preferences will 
remain stable. But she is typically unaware that the transaction itself might 
change her preferences. Such a change will undermine her will to exercise the 
open doors option. In a way, therefore, open doors give consumers a false sense 
of market power. But, they end up perpetuating the inequalities between 
contracting parties that they were supposed to minimize. 
This argument is challenging philosophically, because it requires a flexible 
and layered use of the concept of “consumer preferences.” Consumers are not 
coerced into refraining from exercising an open door option, or misled as to its 
terms. Furthermore, consumers’ decision to refrain from rescinding the contract 
is based on a genuine value they attach to their possession. That is, their 
preferences regarding the relevant product might have changed in light of their 
ownership, but their decision (not to rescind the contract) reflects their 
preferences once they possess the product. In economic terms, this is Pareto 
efficient: the transaction moves the product to the hands of the party that values 
it the most. 
To explain why this seemingly legitimate exercise of preference merits legal 
attention (and perhaps even intervention), the notions of first-order and 
second-order preferences should be introduced.76 This terminology highlights 
the difference between one’s short-term, or current, preferences, and one’s 
long-term preferences. That is, the value one assigns to a product (for example, 
 
endowment effect. . . . [C]onsumers will fail to perceive the risks of taking a product home—they will, 
in effect, really perceive it as a ‘no risk’ offer.”). 
 74. Gerald E. Smith & Thomas T. Nagle, Frames of Reference and Buyers’ Perceptions of Price and 
Value, 38 CAL. MGMT. REV. 98, 101 (1995). It is generally agreed that sellers are not subject to the 
endowment effect with regard to their merchandise. 
 75. Articulating the exact influence on consumers is yet a challenge due to lack of empirical data. 
See Wood, supra note 68, at 158 (“Behavioral investigation of the issue is nonexistent.”). 
 76. For a discussion of these terms, coined by Harry Frankfurt, in the legal context, see generally 
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interferences With Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986). See also 
Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 243 (1998). 
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a new luxury car or an expensive piece of jewelry) at the time he purchases it 
(or chooses not to return it) is not always aligned with his long-term life goals 
(for example, education, saving, or health care). Therefore, in the examples 
presented above, individuals misperceive the change in their first-order 
preferences, which may not match their second-order ones—a change they 
might regret later. 
This analysis still might confront powerful challenges. Not in every case does 
a consumer-based transaction potentially involve an internal conflict between 
long- and short-term goals. Therefore, a different way to explain the problem 
might be needed. This alternative explanation relies on the need to maintain the 
consumers’ ability to engage in autonomous decisions, free from external 
influences of interested parties. Open doors might undermine such an ability. 
The hidden elements of the endowment effect, which open doors bring to 
life, conflict with the human preference for autonomous decisions. This is so for 
two main reasons. First, individuals are unable to account for the cognitive 
failings occurring in the open door context.77 Second, external forces generate 
an endowment effect that is powerful enough to manipulate an individual’s 
choices, and might be doing so intentionally.78 
3. Inertia and the Costs of Exercising Open Doors 
Consumers tend to overestimate their chance of exercising open door 
options, and their ability to do so. At the time of contract formation, individuals 
are unlikely to understand the full implications of later rescinding the contract. 
This misunderstanding occurs even when the entire process of applying the 
open door option is transparent to consumers.79 In other words, individuals are 
not likely to fully comprehend the cost—in time, attention, anxiety, and out-of-
pocket expenses—involved in exercising an open door. At the same time, 
sophisticated parties understand quite well the true obstacles inherent in using 
the open door option. 
Individuals tend to overestimate their ability to exercise open door options 
because of several cognitive shortcomings. Generally, people are hard pressed 
to properly assess risks and actions that transpire in the distant, uncertain 
future. They tend to be over-confident and over-optimistic about future 
outcomes.80 Their inclination is to employ optimistic narratives about future 
 
 77. The question as to whether the law must engage in active debiasing when cognitive failings lead 
to errors of judgment is quite complex and calls for legal analysis beyond the scope of this paper. On 
this issue, see Avishalom Tor, Whether and When To Debias Through Law, LAW AND BUSINESS 
(forthcoming) (in Hebrew, on file with authors), and sources quoted therein. 
 78. This form of manipulation presents a much easier case for government intervention. See 
Sunstein, supra note 76, at 1159. Yet, this intervention does not pertain to all instances of open doors, 
as it calls for some level of a sellers’ intent to manipulate consumers. 
 79. As opposed to instances in which such misunderstanding results from the firm’s withholding 
relevant information about this issue at the time of the transaction, providing misleading data, or 
providing full data in an incomprehensible manner. See generally Sovern, supra note 4. 
 80. See generally Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: 
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce At the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993). 
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deeds and plans: standing in line to return a product, they assume, will take only 
a short time; the phone representative will respond to their request relatively 
promptly. And all this will take place when the individual has ample free time 
to deal with these matters. 
Even if individuals properly understand the meaning of exercising an open 
door option ex ante, they are likely to err and overestimate their ability and 
willingness to actually do so. In most cases, rescinding a contract requires 
action. But people tend to maintain the status quo and remain passive, even if 
by doing so they fail to maximize utility.81 Even when choosing action, they 
often procrastinate and postpone what has to be done. 
Procrastination in the open door context acts as a double threat. First, it 
might lead to accidentally missing the timeframe in which a transaction can be 
rescinded. Second, procrastination will cause individuals to put off a decision to 
use an open door as much as possible. By that later point in time, the 
endowment effect will contribute to inaction. Thus, procrastination leads to a 
higher chance of ignoring an open door option. These considerations are mostly 
unapparent to an individual, so they cannot be incorporated into her 
calculations and decision.82 
 
4. Open Doors and the (Mis)perception of Happiness83 
Open doors serve a basic psychological function. They allow one party to 
delay, albeit for a limited period of time, a sometimes painful human activity: 
decision-making. Studies indicate that many individuals do not care for certain 
experiences of decision-making. It seems that open doors afford individuals a 
soothing experience of extra time to make decisions.84 
 
For a discussion of over-optimism in the context of consumer borrowing, see, for example, Oren Bar-
Gill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004); Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and 
Overborrowing, 2004 BYU L. REV. 127 (2004). One might ask why firms (and their executives) are not 
also overoptimistic in formulating these return policies. The classic response would be that the firms 
can easily de-bias such a tendency, relying on extensive experience, empirical data, and expert advice. 
 81. For an interesting discussion of the status quo bias, people’s preference toward inaction, and 
the omission bias, see generally Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and Omission Bias, 5 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1992). Current research suggests mechanisms that may at times overcome 
this tendency. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using 
Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Savings, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164 (2004). 
 82. We further assume that it is unlikely that consumers will adopt a “correction mechanism” as a 
result of their past experience. For a different opinion on consumers’ ability to learn from experience, 
see Epstein, supra note 17, at 811–13. 
 83. As well-being and happiness are vague and elusive notions, one might wonder whether it is the 
role of regulators to directly advance individuals’ well-being and happiness, as opposed to the 
customary objectives of maximizing utility. We submit that there is no reason to limit legal analysis of 
utility to the narrow meaning of monetary gain. Moreover, as the economic analysis of open doors is 
closely aligned with the psychological one, we present the latter as mere corroborative evidence of our 
central point concerning the hidden problems of open doors. 
 84. Although we are not aware of empirical findings on consumers’ perception regarding this point, 
this understanding can be inferred from Daniel Gilbert’s lecture. Daniel Gilbert, Address on Happiness 
(Feb. 2004), available at http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_gilbert_asks_why_are_we_happy.html. 
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Yet, psychology studies show that at the end of the day, open doors prove to 
be something very different. Open door provisions may cause people to 
depreciate their choices. For example, in one study, participants were happy to 
select an item and be allowed to opt out and replace it with another. However, 
the option to opt out caused participants to devalue the item they initially 
chose.85 At the same time, participants that were not allowed to change their 
chosen item increased their preference for that item. Phenomena such as this 
can lead to hesitation and doubt, which can lead to stress or dissatisfaction. 
In the same study, participants who were not provided with the open door 
showed no regret, confusion, or doubt. Quite the contrary: the fact that this 
group’s decision was irreversible triggered their “psychological immune 
system,”86 which encourages satisfaction with one’s choice. The group that had 
to make inescapable decisions liked their items more than the group that was 
able to regret its decisions.87 
Individuals thus often tend to overestimate the psychological benefits 
associated with open doors. They underestimate the anxiety and anguish open 
doors might entail. At the same time, people are ignorant about the effect of 
the “psychological immune system” and its ability to enhance their satisfaction 
with an item they are unable to return. Therefore, individuals tend to err in 
evaluating the chances that they will want to use an open door. 
B.  The Consequences of Misperception 
At the ex ante stage, individuals will misperceive the likelihood that they 
will make actual usage of an open doors option. They will most probably 
assume that the chances of exercising this option are higher than they really are. 
Such misperception may lead to several outcomes, which are, at times, 
detrimental to the weaker contracting party as well as to society at large. 
The first outcome is that misperception of an open door option will lead to 
overpaying, which is both unfair and inefficient. The second outcome is that the 
misperception might lead to flaws in the weaker party’s perception of other, 
broader attributes of the product or service—again, leading to an unfair and 
inefficient outcome. The third outcome is that the misperception generates 
flaws in the market’s ability to regard an open door option as an accurate 
signaling mechanism, an outcome that systematically disfavors weaker parties. 
In most cases, only the latter two outcomes warrant concern. 
The analysis moves to examine these outcomes, while employing several 
distinctions made above. First, it distinguishes the three forms of open door 
manifestations in law: mandatory, default, and voluntary. The analysis also 
distinguishes open doors of various forms and levels of salience. And, it 
 
 85. Daniel T. Gilbert & Jane E.J. Ebert, Decision and Revisions: The Affective Forecasting of 
Changeable Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503, 509–10 (2002). 
 86. Id. at 504. 
 87. Id. at 509. 
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distinguishes between misperceptions that transpire, perhaps innocently, in the 
market, and those that are induced or exacerbated by sophisticated, repeat 
players. 
1.  Misperception and Option Pricing 
Open doors, like other options, have a price. They come at a cost to firms, 
and have inherent value to purchasers.88 Where possible, firms will strive to roll 
such costs over to ex ante consumers (as opposed to rolling the costs ex post to 
those making use of the open doors).89 The price will thus be the incremental 
rise in the overall price of the transaction as a result of the open door option. 
The first potential negative outcome of consumers’ misperception regarding 
the actual use of open doors is miscalculation of the value of open doors. 
According to this line of thinking, consumers believe that the option is worth 
more than it really is. They may overpay for it. 
While this analysis is interesting (and calls for further economic modeling), 
this article will not pursue this line of thought. The inefficiencies and unfairness 
for unsophisticated players in this context are negligible. The “price” of the 
option cannot be more than a small fraction of the overall price, and any unfair 
increment will not be more than a small fraction of the price. It is questionable 
as to whether pursuing such limited inefficiencies through regulation is 
worthwhile, especially in markets where strong competition exists.90 
In addition, several countering cognitive heuristics might be at play—at 
times possibly offsetting each other’s effects.91 For instance, countering the 
tendency of unsophisticated players to overvalue an open door option is their 
tendency to underestimate the likelihood of exercising that option. This is 
because of individuals’ well-reported tendency to be over-optimistic and over-
confident. Accordingly, over-optimism might lead unsophisticated players to 
underprice these options, thus countering their tendency to overvalue open 
doors. 
The problem of miscalculation of the value of open doors pertains to all 
forms of open door options (mandatory, default, or voluntary). However, it is 
 
 88. For an explanation of the costs in terms of depreciation of the product, see Ben-Shahar & 
Posner, supra note 5, at 5. For a broader description of other costs and expenses, see generally Becher 
& Zarsky, supra note 21. 
 89. This can be done by employing restacking fees and fines. Firms usually refrain from setting fees 
so high that they will clearly impede the perception of the open door. Some scholars note that in 
specific instances, fees are appropriate. See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 16. 
 90. Furthermore, the analysis calls for an extensive set of assumptions, which are not supported by 
empirical findings. For instance, we must assume that, not only is the open door option salient in the 
eyes of the ex post party, but the incremental rise in the overall costs of the transaction is salient as 
well—a questionable notion which would be very difficult to prove empirically. 
 91. This point is made with caution. At times, cognitive effects that seem to be pointing in opposite 
directions, thus offsetting each other, rely on very different cognitive processes. For a critical discussion 
of the analysis of countering heuristics, see Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral 
Approach to Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV. 237, 275 (2008). 
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hard to believe that firms will risk public backlash for such minute gains.92 Such 
backlash may transpire if the public learns of these unfair pricing strategies that 
take advantage of consumer shortcomings. It is furthermore questionable as to 
whether this concern indicates actual manipulation and deliberate deception by 
firms.93 But as we explain next, the implications of the misperceptions at play 
are far broader. 
2.  Open Doors and Risk Miscalculation of the Overall Transaction 
The misperceptions regarding open door options make a substantial impact 
on parties’ perception of the entire transaction. This leads parties to engage in 
transactions that are contrary to their long-term, second-order preferences.94 
The existence of an open door affects the decision-making process of the 
relevant parties. Typically, transacting parties focus their attention and 
calculation at the time of contract formation. Here, they should consider both 
long- and short-term objectives. However, the existence of an open door allows 
a contracting party to split the decision-making process into two stages. The 
first takes place at the time of the transaction (T’0). The second occurs later on, 
close to the point at which the open door is about to close (T’1). This split in the 
decision-making process is perhaps the most crucial outcome of the open 
door—and leads to surprising results. 
With T’1 in view, a consumer will postpone part of her deliberation process, 
and thus pass through T’0 with greater ease. How much of the overall decision-
making process will the consumer allocate to T’0? In the context of a two-week 
return policy, “[i]f the transaction[] costs are less than the value of the 
utilization of the good for two weeks, then the maximizing consumer pays for 
the good and takes it home.”95 While one can easily argue that the average 
consumer is not a fully rational “maximizing” decision-maker, the postponing of 
a substantial part of the overall decision-making process to T’1 seems very 
plausible. And considering the general tendency to maintain flexibility and 
delay irreversible decisions,96 such actions are indeed feasible.97 
 
 92. In terms of the limited sums firms can overcharge for such options. 
 93. As mentioned, it is easier to justify intervention in instances where the consumers’ preferences 
might have been manipulated intentionally, as opposed to regulation countering cognitive failure (such 
regulation might raise the specter of paternalism). See supra note 78. In addition, competition probably 
cannot resolve this issue because firms are aware of the cognitive failures at play and they all have an 
incentive to exploit them. Moreover, firms might be reluctant to educate consumers because once 
consumers are educated, other firms will follow and switch their policies. This will render the initial 
educational efforts worthless. See, e.g., Gilo & Porat, supra note 26. 
 94. For an explanation of these terms in this context, see supra note 76 and accompanying text. The 
second-order preference in this context might be, inter alia, aesthetics, frugality, free will, and freedom 
from manipulations. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Wood, supra note 68, at 158 (referring to Barbara Kahn, William L. Moore & Rashi Glazer, 
Experiments in Constrained Choice, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 96 (1987)). 
 97. Once again, it is assumed that the existence of the open door option is salient, at least as 
regards to taking into account its existence (and not necessarily its price and terms). 
BECHER & ZARKSY 2/15/2011   
Spring 2011] OPEN DOORS, TRAP DOORS, AND THE LAW 85 
At first glance, the mere splitting of the decision-making process should not 
be deemed problematic. However, the (usually subconscious) analysis carried 
out at T’0 with regard to splitting the decision-making process is flawed. At T’0, 
individuals base their analysis on the assumption of a specific level of costs that 
the decision at T’1 will entail. Additionally, the analysis is premised on the 
presumption that their short-term, first-order preferences will remain stable and 
that the process as a whole will not prove unpleasant. As noted, all three 
assumptions are wrong, to the detriment of consumers. 
When these factors are taken in account, an open door seems less like a 
consumer perk and more like an enticing retail trap. It lures individuals into 
transactions with the promise of exit. This promise is not likely to be fulfilled.98 
Consumers end up accepting contracts that do not meet their second-order 
preferences after wrongfully believing they will have an easy exit. These 
dynamics lead to outcomes detrimental not only to consumers (by hindering 
their autonomy), but also to the market at large. They yield inefficient 
outcomes that distort the market and undermine firms’ incentives—and 
ability—to provide better products and services. 
To briefly summarize, open doors are problematic because they shift 
decisions to T’1. Decisions at T’1 are not necessarily aligned with long-term, 
second-order preferences because they are affected by cognitive biases, which 
lead to irrational decisions. The lack of such cognitive failings at T’0 is the reason 
why we prefer decisions to be made at that juncture. Of course, at T’0, there are 
problems as well (such as insufficient information and unclear risks). But, 
assuming that providing an open door is a consumer panacea is simply wrong. 
The problems associated with the open door dynamic can occur 
inadvertently. But, they can also result from a carefully structured manipulative 
scheme. Sophisticated players can strive to enhance the salience of specific 
elements, such as the existence of an open door option, thus encouraging the 
opposing party to split their decision-making process.99 This can be done 
through advertising that clearly emphasizes the benefits of open doors while 
leaving out the low rate of their use, as well as by utilizing the hidden effects of 
endowment and procrastination. 
It is, of course, difficult to establish whether firms deliberately engage in 
such manipulative practices. However, when an opportunity to manipulate 
arises, and incentives to do so exist, there is a very high chance that 
manipulation will indeed occur.100 When consumers’ miscalculations result from 
such manipulation, the case for intervention and regulation is easier to make.101 
 
 98. ARIELY, supra note 73, at 137. 
 99. See sources cited supra note 62. 
 100. Hanson & Kyser, supra note 73, at 743 (“Manufacturers will respond to market incentives by 
manipulating consumer perceptions in whatever manner maximizes profits.”). 
 101. Once again, the vigilant reader might wonder whether the cognitive failures relied on here do 
not cancel out or mitigate each other. On one hand, individuals do not grasp the need for exercising the 
open door option (which might lead to underestimating such an occurrence and the value of this 
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Keeping the specter of manipulation in mind is of great importance when 
structuring the relationship between open doors and the law.102 
Finally, it deserves emphasis that consumers differ in their attitude towards 
risk. Likewise, the behavioral and cognitive failing (or “trap”—depending on 
the seller’s intent) does not pertain equally to all consumers. Some savvy 
consumers will learn to adapt to new market strategies. Others will learn about 
the seductive pull of open door mechanisms from peers and contacts. Some will 
do even better, by benefiting from the additional time to contemplate 
transactions. Yet other consumers will use open doors to “borrow” products at 
no fee. 
The existence of these different groups, however, does not undermine the 
argument set out here. Some individuals might be immune to the lure of open 
doors. Yet for less sophisticated consumers, lenient open door options are 
powerful tools that convince them to engage in transactions that may not suit 
their long-term, second-order preferences, and are inefficient overall. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of consumers “escaping” the problems of 
open doors probably exacerbates those problems. Abuse and misuse of open 
door options generate additional costs to firms. Firms providing open doors will 
strive to roll these costs over to less sophisticated consumers, thus generating a 
problematic cross-subsidy among these groups.103 These issues increase the need 
to examine the legal protection of less sophisticated segments of consumers. 
3.  Open Doors as an Inaccurate Signaling Mechanism 
Another way to understand open door options is as “signaling mechanisms.” 
An open door assures buyers that the firm is willing to rescind the contract and 
incur associated costs.104 By doing so, the firm signals that it is confident that 
buyers will rarely experience dissatisfaction and exercise their open door 
option.105 Slightly restated, vendors can express their confidence that their 
product will basically meet buyers’ expectations by offering open doors. 
Signaling can play out in several ways. First and foremost, it can occur by 
the mere offering of open door provisions (as opposed to not offering any). It 
 
contractual right). On the other hand, they overestimate its value. We do not find these elements 
aligned so we do not believe that they cancel each other out. True, the benefits of open doors might be 
discounted at T0. Yet, the benefits that are recognized lead to the splitting of the decision-making 
process, and pushing part of it into the future—where cognitive fallacies come alive. Additional 
research is still required to resolve this point. 
 102. Hopefully, future work will establish whether applying mandatory or default open doors can 
impact the problem of deliberate manipulation. 
 103. Cf. Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005) 
(opining that the solutions and suggestions associated with libertarian paternalism will often improve 
the welfare of irrational persons at the expense of the rational ones). 
 104. As explained above, in many cases, at least some of the costs are rolled over to the other party. 
Yet it is not necessarily known or salient to the average consumer at the time of contract formation. In 
addition, in competitive markets, a consumer’s intuition that at least some of the costs will be borne by 
the seller is mostly correct. 
 105. Wood, supra note 68, at 159. 
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could be manifest in the features of open doors: the extended time period for 
rescinding the original contract, the limited transaction costs associated with 
rescinding the contract (“Hassle Free!”), et cetera. This form of signaling is 
added to the great variety of other signals coming from parties in the 
marketplace, such as price, brand, and reputation. 
Accepting an open door as a signaling mechanism calls for several 
assumptions discussed above regarding its salience. First, we must assume that 
consumers understand that exercising an open door mechanism entails costs, so 
firms adopting such provisions signal quality. For such signaling to occur, the ex 
ante weaker party (usually the consumer) must take into account the existence 
of the open door option at the time of transacting. For other—more detailed—
elements of this signal (period, cost, et cetera), we must assume that the parties 
account for, recall, and even compare various facets of the available open door 
options in the market. This latter assumption is quite weak; therefore, assuming 
this form of fine signaling is incorrect. 
In view of the previous analysis, it becomes clear that the signaling 
mechanism at play is flawed. The analysis shows that firms’ exposure to 
expenses related to an open door is substantially less than the typical consumer 
might assume.106 In fact, the signal a firm sends out by employing an open door 
is not backed by the firm’s or the product’s actual performance. Thus, the 
consumer will engage in the transaction or overpay for the product because of 
an inaccurate signal. What makes this issue exceptional and complicated is that 
the firm’s presentation is factually true. That is, the firm is indeed willing to 
replace the product or rescind the transaction at the consumer’s will. Yet firms 
might still mislead, given consumers’ lack of understanding of their own 
behavior. 
As in other areas of the law, a possible response to consumers’ 
misunderstanding as to the true meaning of signals is information disclosure. 
Accordingly, legislatures might require sellers to disclose information regarding 
the extent of actual returns. By making such information available, consumers 
will learn that the open door is hardly a signal for quality. 
However, such disclosures can backfire. Providing consumers with 
information about the limited number of returns might exacerbate the signaling 
distortion. Consumers might wrongfully interpret the low rate of returns as a 
signal of satisfaction, whereas the complete picture is much more complicated. 
Thus, this problem calls for a more nuanced response. 
While open doors clearly function as signals when they are voluntary (and 
especially when rendered salient by advertising), it is a more complicated issue 
with regard to mandatory and default open doors. Seemingly, the enactment of 
 
 106. This is aside from the fact that costs are, in part, borne by the buyers from the very beginning. 
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mandatory open doors neutralizes all signaling. In a mandatory regime, an open 
door is not the result of a firm’s goodwill but of a governmental mandate.107 
One might argue that even in this setting, firms can signal their use of open 
doors by providing terms that go beyond the regulatory mandate. But this 
would be a costly venture. It would also probably be unnoticed by the average 
consumer, for whom such contractual elements are non-salient. Thus, a 
mandatory open door policy is a partial solution to the signaling problems. 
However, it comes at the high price of market inefficiency and harm to 
autonomy.108 
Default open door mechanisms set by law raise additional questions, which 
call for further examination. For instance, one interesting question is whether 
consumers would view adhering to a default government standard as a sign of a 
firm’s goodwill.109 At first glance, it seems that setting defaults (if these are well-
known to the public) will indeed weaken the signaling force of lenient open 
doors adopted by firms. This is an additional element that policy-makers ought 
to consider. 
V 
CONCLUSION: THE PATH TO NEW PERSPECTIVES ON OPEN DOORS 
Open doors have positive attributes. Their existence is rooted in the 
American culture. Consumers appreciate open doors, and are willing to pay a 
premium for them. At the same time, firms are willing to provide open doors. 
Modern commerce proves that open doors are sometimes a necessary tool to 
enhance market activity and guarantee a minimal standard of fairness. 
Yet, open doors lead to intricate consequences. Some of which are 
detrimental and manipulative to the weaker party, who is typically not aware of 
the open door’s inner workings. Legislatures cannot assume that open doors are 
a simple “one-size-fits-all” solution to thorny problems. Consumers are 
heterogeneous. They differ in their decision-making processes, risk preferences, 
and degrees of rationality. Therefore, the legal response to open doors presents 
an intriguing analytical question, which is made more acute by the very 
different approaches taken on either side of the Atlantic. 
 
 107. One might indeed argue that the analysis assumes that the public is aware of the mandatory 
element in the open door policy. Whether this is true or not is for empirical testing to decide. However, 
this issue could be resolved by increasing education on existing and future mandatory open doors to 
limit this problem. It could also be resolved by forbidding vendors to present open doors as voluntary 
when they are mandatory. 
 108. See generally Becher and Zarsky, supra note 21; Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5. This is 
clearly an issue that requires additional research. Additionally, a mandatory regime will prevent 
consumers from learning from experience and mistakes. 
 109. Cf. Borges & Irlenbusch, supra note 16, at 99 (hypothesizing that “a statutory entitlement 
might weaken the adoption of fairness considerations in the decision-making process,” and that “a shift 
from a voluntarily granted withdrawal right to a statutory one indeed seems to . . . encourage[] 
[consumers] to seek their own benefit [and exercise their withdrawal right]”). 
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As U.S. vendors continue to voluntarily offer extremely lenient return 
polices, EU (and elsewhere) regulators are pushing to expand mandatory return 
polices in many markets.110 One way or another, regulators are missing crucial 
elements that are an inevitable part of the open door dynamic. Some of these 
behavioral, cognitive, and economic elements have been addressed in this 
article. 
Society is constantly striving to achieve a balance. It aims to maintain fair 
markets and consumer autonomy on one hand, yet allows marketers to 
innovate and exercise their autonomy on the other. Whereas many forms of 
marketing that take advantage of cognitive failings are considered “fair play,”111 
it looks as if the current balance is inappropriate and flawed. 
Society should deal with the complexities facing consumers one at a time. In 
every context, we ought to establish which forms of conduct are acceptable—
that is, do not generate extensive market failures or impose impediments on 
individual autonomy—and which forms go too far. This article made the first 
step, unraveling the hidden sides of open door provisions. 
Further policy recommendations in the context of open doors require 
additional studies, some of which were outlined throughout this article. One 
prominent example is the question of whether open doors are salient. It is 
important to examine which elements of open doors consumers account for, 
and which they ignore. Another important issue is the endowment effect, which 
plays a crucial role in our analysis. While economists and psychologists are 
extremely interested in this effect, our analysis calls for refined experiments that 
will take into account various products and elements of open door provisions. 
In addition, studies must address inertia and procrastination trends, and 
differentiate between various markets and products, as well as groups of 
consumers. Regulators will face difficult decisions as to which groups should 
receive preferential treatment at every juncture. 
When mapping out this market-specific response to open doors, two 
additional challenges are worth mentioning. First is the challenge of identifying 
and dealing with markets where the existence of open doors is especially 
beneficial, given the risks and the information gaps that consumers face.112 
Second is the need to take into account the costs that open door options 
generate to both firms and consumers. Such costs include depreciation,113 but 
 
 110. See supra notes 35–36; Becher & Zarsky, supra note 21 (noting mandatory cooling-off period in 
consumer transactions in Israel); SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 27, at 253 (noting that “cooling-off 
periods have been widely adopted in Europe for a wide variety of consumer transactions”). 
 111. Indeed, consumer markets are filled with aggressive, suggestive, and manipulative marketing 
techniques. Merely having a handsome model promote a product constitutes a manipulation. “Two for 
the price of one!” is another marketing scheme that abuses cognitive failings. In these (and other) 
cases, consumers are left to their own devices, and must learn on their own (at times with the help of 
peers, elders, or market forces) how to interpret the surfeit of information that markets provide. 
 112. For a discussion of such specific markets, see generally Becher & Zarsky, supra note 21; Ben-
Shahar & Posner, supra note 5. One example is the market for home electronic appliances. 
 113. Depreciation is the dominant element considered by Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5. 
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also operational costs, missed transactions because of return-policy abuse, as 
well as plain theft.114 These varied costs will sometimes point regulators in 
opposite directions. 
Finally, academics and regulators should explore novel solutions that could 
allow some consumers to enjoy the benefits of open doors while protecting 
others from their enticements.115 This article is merely a modest step. The 
seemingly simple story of open doors opens many interesting doors to intriguing 
questions of human behavior, markets, policy, and law. 
 
 
 114. Open doors enable some forms of theft. See generally Becher & Zarsky, supra note 21. 
 115. Cf. Camerer et al., supra note 27. 
